In this short paper we introduce a general class of games that allow for local (dyadic) and global types of social interactions. By constructing a "potential", we show that every game in this class admits a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. We illustrate the universality of the result through a large spectrum of applications in various disciplines.
Introduction
Suppose, we need to decide which laptop to purchase and assume, for simplicity, that all options are reduced to two choices, PC and MAC. In trying to make a decision, we obviously rely on our intrinsic preferences and a potential benefit based on laptops' features, design, price and our prior computer experience. However, the process does not stop there and we often invoke elements of "social interaction" that can manifest itself in two ways. One is local, when we consult, often on bilateral basis, with our peers (colleagues, co-authors, friends, family members, neighbors). Another is global, which represents the influence exerted by a global "market appeal", that tends to tilt our choice towards more popular product.
The dependence of individuals' utility on the actions and perception of others has been recognized in various studies of social interactions and social networks.
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The purpose of this note is to examine environments that exhibit both local and global influences. More specifically, we consider a class of normal form games where player's payoff for any given action is determined by her intrinsic preference for actions (taste component) We show that, in presence of symmetric dyadic externalities, where each pair of players influences each other in the same way, and a positive global effect, some mild continuity assumptions guarantee that our game admits a pure strategies Nash equilibrium. To prove this result, we demonstrate that our game has a potential (Rosenthal (1973) , Monderer and Shapley (1996) ), whose maximum over the set of all strategy profiles yields a Nash equilibrium of our game. 4 We show moreover that if the set of feasible actions for each player is finite, the symmetry of dyadic influences is sufficient to ensure the existence of a pure strategies Nash equilibrium.
In the next section we introduce the model and state our result. Sections 3 and 4 contain various applications of our model.
1 See, e.g., Becker (1974) , Schelling (1978) , Akerlof (1997), Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman (1996) , Blume (1993) , Durlauf (1999 Durlauf ( ,2003 , Manski (2000) , Blume and Durlauf (2001, 2003) , Durlauf (2001, 2002) , Brock and Durlauf (2002) , , Galeotti at al. (2006 ), Jackson (2008 ), among many others.
2 Dyadic influence matrices have been utilized in empirical studies of various international conflicts. See, e,g., Bueno de Mesquita (1975) , Axelrod and Bennett (1993) , Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) .
3 The global component of social interaction is often called a conformity effect, driven by prestige, esteem, popularity or social acceptance (Akerlof (1980) , Jones (1984) , Bernheim (1994) . 4 The problem of maximizing the potential is quite challenging, however. It is NP-hard even in the case of two feasible actions for each player AND in absence of two out of the three components of the payoff functions above. In fact, this problem is equivalent to the celebrated MAX-CUT problem in combinatorial optimization.
The Model and Results
Consider a class of games G with a finite set of players (society) N = {1, 2, ..., n}. Each player i has a set of feasible actions (pure strategies)
For simplicity, we assume that all X i (and, thus, X) are compact subsets of the Euclidean space T , T ≥ 1. Players' choices x i ∈ X i generate the n−dimensional strategies profile x = (x 1 , x 2 , ..., x n ), which yields the partition of N into clusters of players choosing the same strategies. We denote this partition by π(x) and let S i (x) be the cluster in π(x) which contains player i, as well as all other players j for whom x j = x i . The payoff U i (x) of player i is the sum of three terms:
where |Z| stands for the cardinality of the set Z. The first term describes the intrinsic taste of player i for her chosen action x i . The second term represents the local dyadic social influences of others on player i,
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whereas the last term captures a conformity facet of social influence represented by the number of players who have chosen the same action. We impose the following assumptions:
Assumption A.1: Upper Semi-continuity. The following functions are upper semi-
Assumption A.1 is of a technical nature. Assumption A.2 implies the symmetry of dyadic influence between any two players i and j. Assumption A.3 represents the conformity effect. Our main result is:
Theorem: Under A1, A2, A3, every game in G admits a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. 5 We may explicitly introduce a notion of "peer groups" by simply assuming that the values W j i are equal to zero if i and j do not belong to same peer group.
The proof of the theorem, which is relegated to the Appendix, utilizes the ingenious idea of Rosenthal (1973) to show that our game of social interactions is a potential game studied in Monderer and Shapley (1996) (see also Kukushkin (2007) ).
Note that Assumption A1 is vacuous when X is a finite set. Also in that case, we can dispense with the conformity assumption A3, and, moreover, allow for "congestion effects" when individuals' utility is adversely affected by the number of others making the same choice (Milchtaich (1996) , Konishi, Le Breton, Weber (1997b) ).
Corollary: If the set X is finite, then under A2, every game in G admits a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
Linear-Quadratic Games
We now turn to the examination of environments covered by our result and begin with a class of social interaction games where the taste and dyadic components in (*) consist of linear and quadratic terms.
Network Games
Akerlof (1997) considered a status model where strategic choices of all players represent a unidimensional interval and a individual utility depends on the difference between her own status and the status of others within the society:
where a, b, c, d are positive constants and x is an effort, or a status-producing variable.
Akerlof (1997) also considered a conformity model, 6 where individuals minimize the social distance from their peers:
Ballester, Calvó-Armengol and Zenou (2006) studied the contribution game with the following specification of utilities:
6 See Bernheim (1994) for a more general functional form.
where, a, b > 0, x i is i's contribution and the dyadic social influences are captured by the cross-derivatives Notice that one can expand the unidimensional framework described above. Indeed, let X i be a compact subset of the T −dimensional Euclidean space
and define the utility functions as follows:
where · and ·, · denote, respectively, the Euclidean norm and the Euclidean scalar product of vectors in
If for every i ∈ N , the set of pure strategies X i is a product set, then the analysis of this game can be undertaken along single dimensions as the utility function is separable across the components. However, if X i is not a product set, then the multidimensional setting cannot be decomposed into several unidimensional components.
Neighborhood and Local Interactions
Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman (2003) also examine a continuous set of actions, where player i's utility is given by:
This specification can be decomposed into a private component h i x i + i (x i ) and
The private component can be further decomposed into its mean, h i x i , and a 0-mean stochastic deviation i (x i ). The terms J ij measure the advantages of conformity: when all J ij are positive, there is an incentive to conform. Our theorem applies when a realization of the random variable i is a common knowledge. When the realization is a private information of player i, the analysis requires an alternative approach which we will briefly discuss in the next section.
The Binary Setting
In many social environments, players' strategies are reduced to acceptance or rejection of the action under consideration: 7 quit smoking (Harris and Lopez-Varcarcel (2006) ), become a member of the club (Dixit (2003) ), participate in criminal activities (Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman (1996) ), join an industrial alliance (Axelrod et al. (1995) ), participate in a riot or a strike (Schelling (1978) , Chwe (1999) , Granovetter (1978) ), choose a side in international conflict (Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita (1979) , Axelrod and Bennett (1993) ), purchase a house in a specific residential area (Schelling (1969) ), display a national flag on the Independence Day (Chwe (2006)).
Critical mass and threshold models of collective action
A celebrated example of the analysis of the social influence channels in the dichotomic setting has been offered by Shelling (1978) . In his threshold model of collective action, the participation of an individual in an action depends on the fraction of the population engaged in the action. This model is a special case of (*) without 
In his pioneering paper Granovetter (1978) has pointed out that the influence any given person has on one's decision may also depend on the nature of the pair's relationship. Thus, one needs to reintroduce the second (social interaction) term in (*) to capture heterogeneity of players' dyadic social externalities.
A Theory of International Alliances
In their strategic analysis of international alignments, 8 See also the pioneering work of Bueno de Mesquita (1975 , 1981 on systematic polarity. 9 It is interesting to point out that AB found two stable configurations in Europe, one is the exact partition into the Axis and Allies of World War II, and another that separates the USSR, Yugoslavia and Greece from the rest of Europe.
10 Galam (1996) removes this restriction. 11 Note that the AB model is a special case of the multidimensional extension of the linear quadratic-model in subsection 3.1, where the set of players' pure strategies coincides with the vertices of a unit simplex.
12 This echoes the distinction between strong and weak ties in the analysis of social networks (Granovetter (1973) .
13 Axelrod et al. (1995) test their theory by estimating the choices of nine computer companies to join one of two alliances sponsoring competing UNIX operating system standards in 1988.
Local Interaction, Statistical Physics and Ising' Model
As we indicated in subsection 3.2, the case where the realization of i is a private information of player i, the analysis of the game requires an alternative approach. Each player i knows the realizations of i but has to form beliefs about the strategies of other actors. If the action can only take the values -1 and +1, we have in equilibrium
where F is the cumulative density function of the random variable i (−1) − i (+1).
There are various specifications of parameters h i and J ij . One is the uniform global interaction model considered by Brock and Durlauf (2001) (BD -henceforth) with h i = h
, where h and J are two parameters. BD calculate the Nash equilibrium of this mean field model while assuming that each player believes that the expectation of the action of each of his opponents is identical, say m. BD derive the equilibrium condition on m, and the individual choice probability becomes Prob (η i = 1) =
Assuming, in addition, that the random terms are distributed according to the extreme value distribution with parameter β, F (z) = 1/(1 + exp (−βz)), the equation simplifies to m = tanh β (h + Jm), which is the well-known Curie-Weiss model of magnetization in statistical physics.
Another important model of social interaction is the uniform local interaction model studied by Blume (1993) and Ellison (1993) , where h i = h and J ij = J or 0, depending upon whether or not i and j are neighbors. 
The Multinomial Framework
In this section we consider situations where the players face more than two choices.
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As an illustration, consider a group of co-workers who make their lunch choices among 14 See the excellent survey of Durlauf (2004) on neighborhood effects. 15 While we focus on the discrete setting, most of the results can be extended to a continuous case.
K available restaurants, that vary according to the type of cuisine, food quality, price, service, etc. The restaurants offer price discounts for large groups, and the unit lunch price l k (s k ) in restaurant k is decreasing with s k , the number of reservations it receives. We assume that the utility of player i choosing restaurant k is
, where the first term refers to the intrinsic benefit of player i from a lunch at restaurant k, the second term accounts for the social benefit derived by i from the company of her co-workers j at the lunch table, obtained through dyadic social externalities p ij , whereas the last term, previously viewed as conformity effect, accounts for a monetary impact of the restaurant discount.
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A specific case of this general framework have been examined by Florian and Galam (2000) , who extended the landscape model to include a neutrality as a possible third choice. Brock and Durlauf (2002) , Bayer and Timmins (2005) consider a utility
, where k i is a random effect on player i from making choice k. When the realization of i is the private information of player i, the equilibrium outcome is described by a probability distribution satisfying some consistency properties.
The existence of Nash equilibria in the case where
is shown in Konishi, Le Breton and Weber (1997a) . In the context of jurisdiction formation, where each jurisdiction selects a local public good and finances it on its own, a Nash configuration in this setting is, in fact, a Tiebout or a sorting equilibrium (Schelling (1978) ), where no resident from an existing jurisdiction desires to migrate
elsewhere. An equilibrium profile is described by the partition π(x) and the actions chosen by coalitions in π(x). Here the social interaction game is, in fact, the coalition formation game, where the extent of social influence is limited to members of the same coalition. If functions V i and H are independent of chosen actions, the payoff of a player i is fully determined by the set of players also choosing i's action, and the coalition formation game becomes hedonic (Banerjee, Konishi and Sömnez (2001) , Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002) ). Alternatively, one can generate a hedonic game by ignoring the first and third terms in (*), and setting W i j (x i , x j ) equal to zero for all x i = x j , again restricting dyadic social influence to players choosing the same action.
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16 One could introduce a congestion effect that may even outweigh price advantages. 17 In this case our result has been obtained by Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002) .
Finally, the multinomial setting is a natural framework to analyze strategic formation of clusters in social networks, where each player partitions the rest of the society into "friends" and "enemies". The social network is described by a graph G and the set of vertices N , where an (undirected) edge between i and j implies that both i and j consider the other as a friend. Let
α is a positive parameter and d ij = 1 if there is an edge between i and j, and zero otherwise. In absence of intrinsic preferences over actions, the social heterogeneity is fully described by the graph G, called a sociogram (Moreno (1934) ). Our theorem implies the existence of a Nash equilibrium configuration, and, under certain conditions on the parameters, every Nash equilibrium splits the society into cliques of players, each considering the other as a friend.
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It is also interesting to point out that by considering the complement ofG of G (i.e, players have an edge if they view each other as an enemy), we can utilize the chromatic number ofG (Skiena (1990) ), which is the smallest number of colors needed to color the vertices ofG so that no two adjacent vertices share the same color. Indeed, since adjacent enemies have different colors, the chromatic number provides a lower bound on the number of clusters in a Nash equilibrium partition.
Conclusions
In this short paper we examine the class of social interaction games where the influence of a peer group is generated through symmetric dyadic interactions between every two members of the group. Given the scope of our note, we sketch a wide range of possible applications, whereas a detailed and more elaborated description of the environments covered by our result, is left for a longer version of the manuscript.
Appendix
Proof: Consider an n-dimensional strategies profile x = (x 1 , ..., x n ) of players' strategic choices, which generates the partition π(x) = (S 1 , . . . , S K ) of N , where the mem-bers of each S k choose the same action x k . Define the following function
|S ( We will now show that the third term
is usc as well. 
H(y, r).
Since X i is compact for all i ∈ N , so is Λ, and the function Ψ being usc, attains its maximum x * = (x * 1 , . . . , x * n ) over Λ. We claim that x * is a Nash equilibrium.
Assume, in negation, that there exists a player i ∈ N and a strategy x i ∈ X i such that U i (x) < U i ( x), where x ≡ x i , x * −i :
Since the number of players who choose x i at x exceeds the number of players who chose x i at x * by one, we have: 
